This paper discusses that there is significant benefit in providing stronger security at lower layers of network stack for network servers. It claims to reduce the attack vulnerability of a networked host by providing security mechanisms in a Network Interface Card (NIC). Dynamic access control mechanisms are implemented in hardware to limit access to the services only to authenticated hosts. To this end, it presents the architecture and implementation details of an advanced Secure NIC. It works alongside and augments existing security mechanisms, making deployment practical.
INTRODUCTION
Network security has become a concern with the rapid growth of the Internet. Although a lot of research has been carried out to provide security in application, transport and network layers [1, 2, 3] , the importance of security in data link layer is still underestimated.
An appealing factor about providing security at data link layer is that it can conceal the vulnerabilities present in the upper layers. One of the major difficulties in protecting networked servers is because of the vulnerabilities present in the operating system (OS) and services running in the host. Although secure code writing practices are encouraged, the vicious 'exploit-disclosure-patch' cycle is unavoidable. Hardening the system [4] by restricting the number of open ports and avoiding information leakage are only temporary solutions, since the services running on these open ports too can have vulnerabilities. Moreover, the OS which includes the network stack need not be devoid of vulnerabilities. This paper considers the security challenges in IP over Ethernet [5] networks because of their predominance. Although Ethernet is considered the concepts proposed are general. This paper is organized as follows. We begin with the problems considered in Section II. The architecture of the proposed solution and its FPGA based implementation are discussed in Section III and IV, respectively. Evaluation results are presented in Section V and Section IV concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK SECURITY
Weakness in network architectures coupled with programming flaws in the networking software form the basis of most fundamental problems in network security.
A. Data Link Layer Attacks
The primary weakness with Ethernet is that it is a broadcast system. Every message reaches all parts of the LAN and can be read by any host on the network. This allows an attacker to passively eavesdrop packets going through the network. Also, Ethernet does not provide any mechanism to authenticate the senders' identity. This allows an attacker to generate spoofed packets or to replay earlier eavesdropped packets.
Most commonly known attacks against end hosts on an IP over Ethernet networks are based on Medium Access Control (MAC) Address spoofing or Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [6] poisoning. This forms the basis of many attacks like the DoS and Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
B. Current Solutions
Established techniques to protect Internet-connected machines tend to rely either on filtering packets, or on application-level security. The fIrst technique is used by firewalls, Internet-connected devices running software whose job is to filter or log unwanted network traffic. However, firewalls do not protect against attempts to exploit bugs in application-level software. The second technique is to deploy high-strength application-level security mechanisms. However, authenticated services are built above the network layer and are often themselves subject to attack once discovered on a host. Relying solely on application-level security exposes the problem of the computational expense of such security mechanisms.
C. Attack Surface
Recent trend [7, 8] towards mitigating security risks by minimizing the code you expose to the untrusted users has been gaining popularity. This philosophy is called Attack Surface Reduction (ASR). The core tenet of ASR is that all code has a nonzero likelihood of containing one or more vulnerabilities. Any vulnerability can result in system compromise. ASR is a compromise between perfect safety and unmitigated risk that minimizes code exposed to untrusted users. Methods like Port Knocking and Single Packet Authentication (SPA) [9] are based on this concept. Although both these methods allow administrators to keep the (potentially vulnerable) services hidden from the public, whilst making it available to authorized users, these share the problem that a stack access is required for the implementation to work. This is because they rely on the services provided by the OS, which may contain flaws. For example both Port Knocking and SPA make use of netfilter [10] framework to deny the packets. Recent vulnerabilities found in the netfilter implementation in Linux 2.6 kernels [11] allow a remote host to hang a system running these versions of the software.
III. ARCHITECTURE
belonging to this particular transaction to reach the server process.
Since the IP address and port number that is opened is known only to the client and server (since the packet is encrypted), replay attacks are avoided. Once the packet filter rules are enabled, the client can carryon with the transaction. Detailed sequence of operation is depicted in Figure 2 :
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A. Overview
The doctrine for setting up a secure network server reflects on the core concepts discussed in the earlier sections: service cloaking and authentication. The networked host should be minimalist in design i.e. only required services should be run and access to these services should only be provided to authenticated hosts. And this should be provided in a secure way without depending on other vulnerable software. One way of implementing this methodology is to apply these security mechanisms in the network interface card itself thereby making it independent of OS and applications. This will not only secure the host from data link attacks but also will cover the applications running above it. Full-strength application specific security mechanisms can be used to augment the above mechanisms to provide true end-to-end encryption.
B. Authentication
Authentication is provided in the form of "Knock" sequences embedded in the packets. The packets contain the IP address and port number of the sender. The contents of the packet are encrypted using a shared key. This prevents any third party from extracting the IP address and port number of the sender, thereby disabling him from launching spoofing based attacks. The knock sequences are carried in ICMP packet which will allow external trusted hosts to use this mechanism. The sequence of operations involved in establishing a secure connection is shown in Figure 1 Recent research [7, 8] has shown that rather than trying to minimize the 'exploit-disclosure-patch' cycle, a system's security can be 'virtually' increased via 'security through concealment' method. This method has the added benefit that the protected machines have a greater immunity against zeroday exploits. The crux of the idea is to minimize the ASR by reducing the Code Execution Paths (CEP), which is made visible by a system. Figure 3 The sender first gets the MAC address of the server using normal ARP protocol. The reply in this case is not generated by the network stack of the server. An ARP Processor in the card performs this operation in stateless manner. This mechanism is explained in detail in Section IV. After receiving the MAC address the clients interface card generates a Knock packet. This is validated by the servers NIC and dynamically adds a packet filter table entry in the NIC, which will allow packet 
IMPLEMENTATION

A. Overview
The card is designed in house as a PCI add-on board. It consists of an Altera Cyclonell (EP2C672C7) FPGA ( Figure  4) . The Ethernet interfaces are provided using LXT972 transceivers. Host connectivity is provided through a 32-bit 33 MHz PCI interface. tcpreplay utility. All the attack packets were dropped by the NIC as these weren't authenticated. Since the packets were dropped in the Secure NIC itself, the server didn't observe any processing overhead during the attack sessions. As seen from Fig.6 there is a considerable difference in CPU load during attacks with the Secure NIC. The graph shows a reduction of CPU usage from 97% to 12% load.
• CPU Load The Data Path Processor is implemented using the Nios II softcore processor. It is responsible for the overall control of the card. During transmission it generates the knock packet. It also processes the received knock packet. The MAC address of the validated knock along with the source IP obtained from the knock is provided to the host through the host interface for ARP cache updation. It also configures the packet filter table using the parameters obtained from the validated knock. Thus the filter block allows only validated packets to be sent to the host.
V. EVALUATION
For evaluating the system, DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset was used. This traffic included various attack traffic profiles. The traffic was replayed using VI. CONCLUSION Despite many research and development efforts in the area of network security, it appears that the importance of data link layer security is still underestimated. This paper shows that there is significant benefit by implementing security mechanisms at the data link layer. This considerably reduces the code execution path for most transactions thereby minimizing the attack vulnerability of the system. The proposed mechanisms were implemented in hardware and incorporated in a programmable network interface card.
